



he growth experience in the period
1995-2001 in OECD countries repre-
sents a major break from the slow
growth performance of the previous two
decades or so. First, in the mid-1990s econom-
ic growth in most OECD countries, notably in
the United States, greatly accelerated. Second,
across OECD countries the variation in output
growth, and more speciﬁcally in productivity
performance, increased substantially. And third,
despite the slowdown in growth during the
years 2000 and 2001, the underlying trend in
productivity growth begun in 1995 held up.
Indeed the United States experienced only a
minor slowdown in productivity growth in
2001, whereas Europe and Canada continued
along a path of slow productivity growth begin-
ning in the mid-1990s.
An analysis of these trends and an expla-
nation for differences over time and across coun-
tries are important for several reasons including
the study of social progress. Productivity meas-
ures the effectiveness with which inputs (mate-
rials, capital and labour) are transformed into
output. This transformation process is accom-
modated for by continuous improvements in
the quality of inputs, such as a rise in educa-
tional attainment, the creation of knowledge,
organizational changes within ﬁrms or the set-
ting up of societal networks. All of these fac-
tors, which I refer to as intangible investments
in the economy, facilitate allocation of inputs
to their most productive uses.
Productivity — in this paper, more
speciﬁcally labour productivity — is impor-
tant for social progress for two reasons. The
ﬁrst and more obvious reason is that, togeth-
er with a greater use of labour, productivity
positively contributes to per capita income,
which is a reasonable proxy for living stan-
dards in a country.
1 The second reason is that
labour-productivity growth often reﬂects the
accumulation of intangible capital, which
itself contributes to social progress, as work-
ers become equipped with more human cap-
ital, more knowledge and access to networks,
and which may ultimately even lead to the
creation of more social capital.
2
This paper is intended to contribute to
our understanding of the link between eco-
nomic performance and social progress, by





































































Bart van Ark text  11/27/02  2:16 PM  Page 69in growth and levels of productivity and per
capita income in OECD countries. Figure 1
presents a conceptual framework for studying
sources of growth and productivity differen-
tials. This framework is rooted in a tradition-
al growth accounting framework but has
several crucial extensions. For instance, it
shows the importance of both productivity
and increased labour participation in driving
growth in per capita income. The next section
documents the most recent evidence on this
with preliminary estimates up to 2001. It
shows that much of the recent growth in per
capita income in Europe (and Canada) is driv-
en by a rise in employment/population ratios,
although partly offset by a decline in the num-
ber of average annual working hours per per-
son. The strong rebound in employment
growth in Europe beginning in the mid-
1990s has been quite welcome after many
years of relatively low rates of labour force par-
ticipation. But the expansion takes place along
a track of slow productivity growth. In con-
trast, the United States seems to have
embarked on an expansion along a high pro-
ductivity growth path in combination with
greater labour utilization.
To investigate the forces behind produc-
tivity growth, one can adopt one of two
approaches or — ideally — a combination of
the two. The ﬁrst is to look at the sources of
growth from the perspective of factor inputs,
in particular capital, and their contribution to
productivity at the aggregate level. The second
is to investigate the contribution of industries
to productivity growth, which may be the
result of either productivity advances within
industries or shifts of resources from low-pro-
ductivity to high-productivity industries.
Various authors have argued that the
recent American productivity advances are due
to large investments in information and com-
munications technology (ICT) goods and serv-
ices and to productivity advances in the
ICT-producing sector of the economy
(Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000; Oliner and Sichel
2000; Jorgenson 2001). This paper discusses
the sparse results available so far on the contri-
bution of ICT capital vis-à-vis other physical
capital to productivity growth across countries.
The evidence suggests an acceleration of ICT
investment in most OECD countries, but the
contributions of ICT capital to output and pro-
ductivity growth are generally lower in Europe
(and Canada) than in the United States.
Unfortunately, for most countries we still lack
sufficient data on ICT capital at the industry
level to investigate whether the differences in
ICT-capital contributions are not at least part-
ly due to differences in industry composition,
such as the United States having a larger ICT
production sector.
We therefore proceed by looking at the
contributions to aggregate labour-produc-
tivity growth from the perspective of three
subgroups of industries: those classiﬁed as
producers of ICT goods and services, those
that typically are intensive users of ICT, and
those that are less intensive users of ICT. The
results suggest substantial differences in the
productive use of ICT. It also appears that
the strong employment growth in European
economies is concentrated in industries that
are typically not regarded as big users of ICT.
Productivity in this group of less-intensive
ICT users grows more slowly than elsewhere
in the economy, particularly in European
countries compared to the United States.
Differences in ICT investment and intensity
are therefore unlikely to account for the
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productivity growth is driven by a second type
of investment, namely that in intangible capi-
tal. The ﬁnal section of the paper focuses on
differences in the creation of intangible capital
that may account for some of the cross-coun-
try differentials in productivity growth and
levels. Although other classiﬁcations are possi-
ble, I distinguish among human capital,
knowledge capital and organizational capital
as components of intangible capital. Using
recent numbers from the OECD, which
include those components of intangible capi-
tal that are easiest to quantify (software, formal
higher education, R&D), I ﬁnd only a weak
relation between intangible expenditures and
either productivity growth or productivity lev-
els. However, I also argue that a larger effect of
intangibles is likely to be found in the organi-
zational component of intangible capital. In
the conclusion, I summarize the implications
for the link between productivity and social
progress and I brieﬂy outline the agenda for
further research.
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INCOME PERFORMANCE IN 
OECD COUNTRIES
Labour productivity and per capita
income are two key measures of economic per-
formance. Per capita income is a reasonable (but
incomplete) proxy for living standards. The
attractive feature of this measure is that it can
be easily linked to labour productivity, there-
by opening up the comprehensive framework
for investigating the sources of growth by way
of growth accounting. Table 1 summarizes per
capita income and productivity growth rates for
Canada, the United States and the European
Union for the periods 1990-95 and 1995-
2001.
3It shows that all three experienced a sub-
stantial improvement in per  capita income
growth in the latter period. In 2001, output




Summary Growth Rates of Per Capita Income, Labour Productivity and 
Total Hours Worked, Canada, European Union and United States
Canada European Union
1 United States
Per Capita Income Growth (%)
1990-1995 0.3 1.0 1.4
1995-2001 1.9 2.1 2.6
of which:
1995-2000 2.2 2.3 3.1
2000-2001 0.3 1.5 0.2
Change in growth rates
1995-2001 over 1990-1995 1.5 1.1 1.3
2001 over 1995-2000 -1.9 -0.7 -3.0
Labour-Productivity Growth (%)
1990-1995 1.3 2.5 1.1
1995-2001 0.9 1.3 2.0
of which:
1995-2000 1.0 1.4 2.0
2000-2001 0.2 0.6 1.8
Change in growth rates
1995-2001 over 1990-1995 -0.4 -1.2 0.9
2001 over 1995-2000 -0.9 -0.8 -0.2
Total Hours Worked (%)
1990-1995 0.2 -1.0 1.2
1995-2001 2.2 1.2 1.6
of which:
1995-2000 2.5 1.2 2.0
2000-2001 0.7 1.1 -0.7
Change in growth rates
1995-2001 over 1990-1995 2.1 2.2 0.3
2001 over 1995-2000 -1.9 -0.1 -2.7
1 European Union is weighted average for 14 EU member countries, excluding Luxembourg
Source: Groningen Growth & Development Center & The Conference Board. See McGuckin and van Ark (2002).  Based on
OECD National Accounts, Economic Outlook, Employment Outlook and Labour Force Statistics, with GDP converted
to US$ at 1996 EKS PPPs.
Bart van Ark text  11/27/02  2:17 PM  Page 72United States appears to be the hardest hit.
When the focus is labour-productivity growth,
however, the changes in growth rates differ
greatly across countries. Whereas the United
States experienced a strong acceleration, in both
Canada and the European Union productivity
growth began to slow down in the mid-1990s.
4
Furthermore, during 2001 productivity slowed
much less in the United States than in Canada
and Europe.
Differences among countries in terms of
growth or relative levels of per capita income
and labour productivity are determined by dif-
ferences in the number of annual working
hours per person employed and the share of the
population at work. For example, even when
two countries have the same productivity lev-
els, a less intensive use of labour — fewer hours
of work, more unemployment, lower labour
participation rates — can cause one country to
have lower per capita income than the other.
This relationship can be conveniently expressed
in a decomposition linking differences in per
capita income and productivity. First, the rel-
ative difference in per capita income (O/P)
between two countries (Xand US) is expressed
as the relative difference in labour productivi-
ty times the relative difference in labour input
per person (H/P):
O/P x-us = (O/H) x-us * (H/P) x-us (1)
Then, the differences in working hours
per person are decomposed into differences
in hours worked per person employed (H/E)
and the share of employment in the total
population (E/P):
H/P x-us = (H/E) x-us * (E/P) x-us (2)
The employment/population ratio (E/P)
can be further broken down into the number
of persons employed relative to the total labour
force (E/L) (i.e., employed persons plus reg-
istered unemployed persons), the ratio of the
labour force to all persons aged 15 to 64
(L/P1564) (i.e., the working-age population)
and the share of the working-age population
in the total population (P1564/P) (see van
Ark and McGuckin, 1999):
(E/P) x-us = (E/L) x-us * (L/P1564) x-us
*(P1564/P) x-us (3)
Table 2 shows the relative levels of
GDP per capita and labour productivity in
2001. The countries are ranked according to
level of per capita income. These estimates are
based on the most recent but still preliminary
estimates for GDP, employment and hours
derived from OECD national accounts and
labour force statistics. GDP is converted from
national currency to US dollars at 1996 pur-
chasing power parities.
5
The estimates show that the United
States has by far the highest per capita income.
Norway comes next, at 17 percentage points (or
5,500 US$) behind the United States. The
European Union as a whole is 33 percentage
points (or 11,000 US$) behind the United
States. Canada is 23 percentage points (or
7,500 US$) behind the United States.
Productivity differences between the
United States and most follower countries are
considerably smaller than the per capita income
differences. In fact, as many as four countries
have a higher level of GDP per hour than the
United States, namely Belgium (4.5 US$ per
hour higher), Norway (3.5 US$), and the
Netherlands and France (about 0.5 US$).
Indeed the productivity level of the European
Union as a whole falls only 13 percentage
points (4.5 US$) behind that of the United
States, which is 20 percentage points less than
the distance between EU and US levels in terms
of per capita income. Some 12 percentage
points of the 20-percentage-point difference
between the EU/US productivity gap and the
73
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working hours per person employed in the
European Union (1,609 hours) than in the
United States (1,868 hours). Another nine percent-
age points are due to the ratio of employed persons




Reconciliation of GDP Per Capita and Labour Productivity, OECD Countries, 2001
(preliminary estimates)
Effect of 
GDP Per Hour  Working  Effect of Employment Share in Total GDP
Worked
1 Hours
1 Population (in % points) Per Capita
Labor Population 
Force to  (15-64 yrs)
in 1996 as % in % Unemploy- Population to Total  in 1996 as %
US$ of US points ment
2 (15-64 yrs) Population Total
3 US$ of US
United 
States 36.97  100.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  33,538  100.0
Norway 40.55  109.7  -28.9  1.0  3.1  -1.6 2.5  27,940  83.3
Ireland 36.36  98.4  -8.8 0.6 -9.7  1.0  -8.1  27,318  81.5
Switzerland 31.73 85.8  -12.8  2.1  5.5  0.6  8.2 27,236  81.2
Denmark 34.58  93.5  -16.4  0.1  2.4  0.4  2.9  26,857  80.1
Canada 30.53  82.6  -3.5 -2.1  -1.2  1.5  -1.8  25,923  77.3
Australia 30.32  82.0  -3.1  -1.7  -1.7  1.5 -1.9  25,818  77.0
Belgium 41.54  112.4  -18.9 -2.1 -15.4  -0.7  -18.2  25,252  75.3
Netherlands 37.32  100.9  -28.1  1.5  -1.1  1.3  1.7  24,989 74.5
Austria 35.46  95.9  -17.9 0.8 -6.3  1.5  -4.0  24,828  74.0
Japan 26.64  72.1  -2.7  -0.1 1.4 1.7  3.0  24,267  72.4
Finland 31.92  86.3  -10.7  -3.4  -2.2  0.9  -4.7  23,795  71.0
Sweden 30.22  81.7  -10.7 -0.3  1.7  -2.0  -0.5  23,636  70.5
Germany 34.20  92.5  -16.6  -2.5  -5.1  1.0  -6.6  23,247  69.3
France 37.63  101.8  -17.8  -3.6 -9.6 -1.6  -14.8  23,176  69.1
Italy 32.53  88.0  -11.0  -4.1  -5.2  0.9  -8.4  22,991  68.6
United 
Kingdom 29.40  79.5  -9.2  -0.2  -1.8  -0.6  -2.7  22,696  67.7
Spain 27.93  75.6  -1.8  -6.6  -12.2 0.9 -18.0  18,723  55.8
New 
Zealand 22.49  60.8 -3.6  -0.3  -0.7  -0.8  -1.9  18,560  55.3
Korea 15.18  41.1  13.6  0.4  -8.4 3.3  -4.7  16,747  49.9
Portugal 19.25  52.1  -3.1  0.3  -1.1  1.2  0.4  16,548  49.3
Greece 21.64  58.5  2.4  -3.9  -10.9  0.7  -14.1  15,696  46.8
Czech Rep.  14.43  39.0  3.2  -1.5  -3.0  2.0  -2.5  13,346  39.8
Hungary 17.44  47.2  -1.8  -0.5  -10.8  1.0  -10.4  11,730  35.0
Poland 11.90  32.2  2.7  -4.8 -4.2  1.1  -7.9  9,021  26.9
Mexico 12.13  32.8  3.0 0.9  -9.6  -2.7  -11.5  8,156  24.3
Turkey 10.16  27.5  1.1  -0.9  -10.2  0.2  -10.9  5,933  17.7
European 
Union
4 32.30 87.4  -12.1  -2.4  -6.0  0.2  -8.2 22,511 67.1
OECD 
excl. US  24.87  67.3  -2.8  -1.5  -7.0  0.1  -8.4  18,818  56.1
1 Calculated on basis of actual hours worked per person per year. 
2 Calculated on basis of standardized unemployment rates from OECD. 
3 Sum of previous columns plus rounding differences. 
4 European Union is weighted average for 14 EU member countries, excluding Luxembourg.
Source: Groningen Growth & Development Center & The Conference Board. See McGuckin and van Ark (2002).
Based on OECD National Accounts, Economic Outlook, Employment Outlook and Labour Force Statistics, with GDP
converted to US$ at 1996 EKS PPPs.
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United States. Most of the difference in the
employment/population ratio is a result of the
share of the labour force in the working-age
population (L/P1564).
In the case of Canada, the productivity
gap is 18 percentage points and the per capita
income gap is 23 percentage points, for a dif-
ference of ﬁve percentage points. Three of those
percentage points are due to Canada’s fewer
working hours per person (1,789 hours) and
two are due to its lower employment/popula-
tion ratio (E/P), with some offsetting effects
between higher unemployment (1-E/L) and
lower labour force participation (L/P1564) on
the one hand and a somewhat larger working-
age population share in the total population on
the other (P1564/P).
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TABLE 3
Growth of GDP Per Capita and Labour Productivity and Differences in Labour Market
Indicators, Canada, European Union and United States
GDP/Capita (US 1990=100) GDP/Hour Worked (US 1990=100)
European United European United
Canada Union
1 States Canada Union
1 States
1990 85.2  70.2  100.0  87.4  85.4  100.0
1991 82.5  70.6  98.5  88.9  88.1  101.0
1992 82.3  71.3  100.4  91.8  90.4  104.0
1993 83.4  70.7  102.0  92.1  92.3  104.3
1994 85.7  72.4  105.1  92.0  95.0  105.4
1995 86.5  73.9  107.0  93.4  96.6  105.8
1996 86.7  74.9  109.8  92.9  97.7  108.2
1997 88.0  76.5  113.6  94.4  99.7  109.9
1998 89.9  78.5  117.3  95.8  100.5  112.0
1999 93.1  80.2  121.0  97.2  101.5  114.3
2000 96.4  82.7  124.9  98.3  103.5  117.1
2001
2 96.7 84.0 125.1  98.5  104.2  119.2
Hours Per Person Employed Employment/Population (15-64) Share
European United European United
Canada Union
1 States Canada Union
1 States
1990 1799  1657  1819  0.468  0.429  0.475
1991 1764  1637  1808  0.455  0.423  0.466
1992 1736  1633  1799  0.447  0.417  0.464
1993 1760  1624  1815  0.445  0.408  0.466
1994 1789  1624  1825  0.449  0.406  0.472
1995 1771  1621  1840  0.452  0.408  0.475
1996 1789  1619  1838  0.451  0.409  0.477
1997 1782  1616  1848  0.452  0.410  0.483
1998 1766  1620  1864  0.459  0.417  0.486
1999 1772  1617  1872  0.467  0.422  0.489
2000 1789  1609  1879  0.474  0.429  0.491
2001
2 1789 1609 1868 0.475  0.433  0.486
1 European Union is weighted average for 14 EU member countries, excluding Luxembourg.
2 Preliminary estimate.
Note: US hours based on total working hours from BLS Productivity Database divided by total numbers 
of employed persons from BLS CPS; Canadian hours from CSLS Productivity Database. European average hours from
GGDC Total Economy Database.
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Center & The Conference Board (http://www.eco.rug.nl/ GGDC/index-
dseries.html). See McGuckin and van Ark (2002).
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labour force participation in both the European
Union and Canada relative to the United States
in 2001 are characteristic of the 1990s (and
indeed of the two preceding decades). Until
1997, labour force participation and working
hours increased at a much slower rate in these
countries than in the United States (Table 3
76
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(b) Hours/Employee (US 1990=100)
(c) Labour Productivity (US 1990 = 100)
(d) Employment/Population (US 1990 = 100)
CHART 1
Reconciliation of GDP Per Capita and Labour Productivity, Canada, US and European Union
Bart van Ark text  11/27/02  2:17 PM  Page 76and Chart 1). In contrast, until about the same
time productivity in the follower countries
increased faster than in the United States,
reﬂecting their long run process of catching up
after the Second World War. Since 1997, how-
ever, labour force participation has increased
more rapidly in Europe and Canada than in the
United States. Yet it still has not led to a fur-
ther narrowing of the income gap, for two rea-
sons. First, working hours per person continued
to decline, particularly in Europe, because of
labour time shortening schemes (such as in
France and Germany) and the creation of many
part-time jobs (such as in the Netherlands).
Second, since 1995 productivity growth in the
United States has zoomed ahead of both
Europe and Canada, which is the main topic of
the next section.
In conclusion, at least two factors may
have contributed to slower income growth in
Europe and Canada relative to the United States
during the 1990s. The ﬁrst is different labour
market arrangements, leading to underutiliza-
tion of the labour potential in Europe and
Canada. This explanation dominated the differ-
ences in income trends until the mid-1990s.
The second factor is slower productivity growth
in Europe and Canada. This has been the main
explanation for better income performance in
the United States in the 1995-2001 period. The
search for an explanation for recent differences
in per capita income performance should there-
fore concentrate on the reasons for the differences
in productivity growth in 1995-2001.
THE ROLE OF ICT CAPITAL
The rapid increase in ICT investment
is seen by many as a key explanation for the
acceleration of productivity growth in the
United States (OECD 2000a, 2001a). Some
stress that this acceleration is to a large
extent due to improved productivity growth
in the ICT-producing sector (Jorgenson and
Stiroh 2000; Jorgenson 2001). Others point
to the increasingly productive use of ICT
goods and services elsewhere in the economy
(Oliner and Sichel 2000; Baily and Lawrence
2001). Most authors, however, agree that
investment in ICT has been heavy and wide-
spread in the United States.
6
Although the international evidence on
the impact of ICT capital on growth is still
sparse, there are some comparative growth
accounting studies that compile ICT invest-
ment as a separate factor input. These stud-
ies mostly derive information on ICT
expenditure from (private) data sources (e.g.,
Schreyer 2000; Goldman Sachs 2000; Daveri
2001). The latter include consumer expendi-
ture, which needs to taken out on the basis
of crude assumptions to arrive at proxies for
ICT investment.
Only recently have attempts been made
to obtain genuine investment series for ICT
(Colecchia and Schreyer 2001; ECB 2001).
The top panel of Table 4 compares the accel-
eration of real investment growth in ICT in
the United States, Canada and ﬁve European
countries (Finland, France, Germany, Italy and
the United Kingdom) for the periods 1990-95
and 1995-99.
7 ICT investment includes IT
goods, communications equipment and soft-
ware. The ﬁgures show that throughout the
1990s growth in ICT investment was quite
high, and not only in the United States. Canada
even experienced a faster rise in ICT investment
than the United States during the second half
of the 1990s. Moreover, many countries have
experienced a greater acceleration of ICT
investment than the United States: Canada,
77
Understanding Productivity and Income
Differentials Among OECD Countries: A Survey
Bart van Ark text  11/27/02  2:17 PM  Page 77Finland, Germany and Italy all show greater
improvement in ICT investment than the
United States.
To estimate the contribution of ICT to
productivity growth, one must transform the
ICT investment numbers into a measure of ICT
capital. This is usually done by cumulating the
investment ﬁgures over the years and applying
certain assumptions about the service lives and
scrapping patterns of the assets (the “perpetual
inventory method”). Service lives of ICT capi-
tal goods are substantially shorter than those of
other capital goods, which raises the pace at
which old capital goods are replaced by new
capital goods. Following Schreyer (2000) and
Colecchia and Schreyer (2001), output growth
(Q) can decomposed into:
Q = sLL + sKCKC + sKNKN+ A (4)
where L is labour input, KC is ICT capital, KN
is all other physical capital and A represents
total factor productivity, with the latter
being measured as a residual (the hats on the
variables indicate percentage rates of change).
Labour and capital services are weighted at
the share of their respective revenues in total
factor income.
8 The bottom panel of Table 4
shows the contribution of ICT capital (KC) to
output growth. Colecchia and Schreyer ﬁnd
a higher ICT contribution for the United
States than for the other countries, with the
exception of Finland.
9 Indeed the larger share
of ICT investment in expenditure (also
shown in Table 4), not the faster growth rate
of ICT investment, accounts for the greater
contribution from ICT capital in the United
States. Daveri (2001), who covers a larger
group of countries but uses adjusted ICT
expenditure proxies for investment, largely
conﬁrms these results. He ﬁnds that the con-




Growth of ICT Investment




2 Finland France Germany Italy UK
Growth of ICT investment in constant prices
1990-1995 12.0 13.5 11.6  9.4  14.4  8.8  6.9 18.9
1995-2000
3 22.8 21.3 17.6 21.0 15.7 17.7 16.3 19.8
Acceleration 10.8  7.8 5.9  11.6  1.2  8.9  9.4  0.9
Share of ICT investment in total non-residential investment
1990 13.2  22.5  12.3  13.2  9.4  13.9  13.7  10.1
1995 16.8    26.1 13.7  16.8  10.8  13.3  14.4  15.6
2000 21.4  29.9 15.8  24.1  14.4  16.2  16.3  15.0
Contribution of ICT services to output growth
1990-1995 0.30    0.43 0.25 0.24 0.18 0.30  0.21 0.27
1995-2000
3 0.57   0.87 0.38  0.62  0.33  0.35 0.36  0.47
Acceleration  0.27 0.44 0.13 0.38  0.15 0.05 0.15  0.20
1 Includes information technology, communications equipment and software.
2 Five European countries, which are the only ones available from Colecchia and Schreyer (2001), are weighted at ICT-
investment shares from Mulder et al. (2001).
3 For Finland and Italy data are available only up to 1999.
Source: Calculated from Colecchia and Schreyer (2001) and Mulder et al. (2001).
^ ^^ ^ ^
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0.64 percentage points over the period 1991-
99, compared to 0.94 percentage points in the
United States. In an earlier version of his paper,
Daveri (2000) also produced estimates for non-
European countries, including Australia and
Canada, which showed ICT contributions as
large as those for the leading group of European
countries such as the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands.
10
In this paper we do not go into many of
the methodological details concerning the calcu-
lation of the contribution of factor inputs to
growth, and the interpretation of total factor pro-
ductivity that emerges as a residual from any
growth accounting study. These have been the
subject of a long debate that is well summarized
in a recent survey article by Hulten (2001). From
the perspective of using ICT as a separate capital
good in the production function, one of the fun-
damental problems is the constant returns that
characterize the production function and that
assume there can be no “supra-normal” returns
from ICT beyond that of other capital goods.
11
Another issue concerns the assumption
of Hicks-neutral technical change, which
implies that technological progress increases
output without changing the proportional dis-
tribution among the factor inputs. This view-
point can be challenged for at least two
reasons. First, a distinction can be made
between the fraction of investment that is
required to keep the capital/output ratio con-
stant (given the state of technology) and the
fraction that is induced by the innovations
themselves. The latter represents the part of
investment that contributes to the outward
shift of the production function and therefore
represents technological change rather than
accumulation.
12 Second, it is generally asserted
that ICT is not neutral to the use of factor
inputs, as it is typically characterized by high
capital-skills complementarity (Berman,
Bound and Machin 1998). Although the latter
issue is relevant from the perspective of invest-
ment in intangible capital, which will be dis-
cussed in the last section, I have not tried to
resolve the links between the factor inputs that
go beyond measuring to also explain produc-
tivity differentials among countries.
At this stage suffice to note that the ﬁg-
ures reported in Table 4 suggest that ICT
investment is one of the causes of slower pro-
ductivity growth in Europe and Canada com-
pared to the United States. However, even
though for most countries the contribution of
ICT to output growth is lower than that of the
United States, one would expect at least some
acceleration in labour-productivity growth
(Table 1). Instead, despite the acceleration of
ICT investment, labour-productivity growth
in many European countries and Canada actu-
ally decelerated.
THE ICT-USE DIFFERENTIAL
As many countries still lack the necessary
statistics, disaggregation of ICT investment by
industry is not possible in the framework of inter-
national comparison. An alternative approach is
to focus on labour productivity, which requires
only output and employment data by industry.
Van Ark (2001b) compares the contributions to
overall labour-productivity growth of three
groups of industries: ICT-producing industries;
intensive ICT-using industries; and industries
that use ICT less intensively, hereafter referred
to as “non-ICT” industries. This approach can
shed light on the role of ICT in growth, for sev-
eral reasons. First, a strong presence of ICT-pro-
ducing industries (i.e., hardware and software
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Finland, is in itself an explanation for a greater
contribution of ICT investment to growth.
Second, a large ICT-producing sector may facil-
itate the process of diffusing ICT to industries
that are major users. Third, some industries in
the economy are much more intensive ICT users
than others. Particularly intensive users are in
found in business and producer services
(McGuckin and Stiroh 2001). These are rela-
tively large industries in which most of the
employment creation of the past decade was con-
centrated and which therefore are key to the
acceleration of productivity growth. This also
implies that a sectoral composition biased against
those industries may be a reason for slower pro-
ductivity growth at the aggregate level.
The precise shares of the three ICT cate-
gories in total output depend on the deﬁnition of
ICT-producing industries and on the empirical
distinction between ICT-using industries and
non-ICT industries. ICT-producing industries as
deﬁned by the OECD include computer hard-
ware and software producers, computer services,
and telecommunications equipment and services
(OECD 2000b). For the deﬁnition of ICT-using
industries, van Ark (2001b) used estimates of ICT
investment/output ratios by industry as well as
the industry shares of ICT capital for two coun-
tries, the United States and the Netherlands.
13
About one third of industries with the highest
ICT intensity and/or the highest shares in ICT
capital stock are deﬁned as ICT-using industries.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 5 show
that the output shares of the ICT-producing
sector are quite low across the board. Even
for the United States the share of ICT pro-
duction in total economy output is less than
7.5 percent of current-dollar GDP in 1999.
With the exception of Finland, the shares of
the ICT-producing sector in nominal output
increased only slightly. The differences in
output shares are mainly due to larger shares
of ICT manufacturing industries in Japan,
the United States and Finland.
The third and fourth columns of Table 5
show the shares of ICT-using industries in
GDP. The United States is again characterized
by larger output shares than all the other
OECD countries except the Netherlands.
However, the differences in output share of the
ICT-using sector are smaller than for the ICT-
producing sector. The differences in shares
between the ICT-using sector are due to dif-
ferences in industry composition across coun-
tries. For example, the relatively high output
share for the Netherlands is due to the larger
share of chemicals in ICT-using manufactur-
ing and of business services in ICT-using serv-
ices. To measure the contribution of the ICT
producing sector, the ICT-using sector and the
non-ICT sector to the growth of labour pro-
ductivity, a traditional shift-share analysis was
employed. This implies that labour productiv-
ity for the total economy (P) can be perceived
as the sum of the productivity contributions of
three sectors (i) distinguished above weighted
at their labour share (Li /L=Si):
14
Table 6 shows the contribution of the
ICT-producing sector, the ICT-using sector and
the non-ICT sector to the growth of labour pro-
ductivity from 1990 to 1999, with the period
being divided into two sub-periods, 1990-95
and 1995-99.
15 In the United States, the ICT-
producing sector and the ICT-using sector
together accounted for almost two-thirds of
labour-productivity growth during the latter
period (0.6 + 1.4 as a share of 2.5). In all other
countries except Finland the combined contri-
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in absolute terms.
16 Table 6 also shows that in
almost all countries ICT production (with the
exception of Denmark) and ICT use (with the
exception of Italy and to a lesser extent Japan and
the United Kingdom) contributed positively to
acceleration in labour-productivity growth during
the second half of the 1990s compared to the ﬁrst
half. However, in several European countries,
notably Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the non-
ICT sector contributed negatively to labour pro-
ductivity acceleration, offsetting the positive
effects of ICT production and ICT use. The mir-
ror-image of the slowdown in productivity
growth in the non-ICT sector is the rapid accel-
eration in employment growth in this part of the
economy during 1995-99. Only in the United
States did employment expansion go together
with a substantial gain in labour productivity.
These effects may relate to differences in the pace
of structural reforms in labour and product mar-
kets (McGuckin and van Ark 2001).
In conclusion, despite a somewhat small-
er role for ICT-producing industries and a mod-
erate positive growth effect from intensive
ICT-using industries, the core of the produc-
tivity problem in Europe, Canada and Japan
seems to lie as much in the non-ICT sector of
the economy as in the intensive ICT-using
industries. In Europe the recent employment
expansion has not been accompanied by the cre-
ation of employment in sectors with rapid pro-
ductive growth in the way that it has in the
United States. Hence we now shift our focus to
another type of investment, one that is cur-
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TABLE 5
Output Shares of ICT-producing, ICT-using and Non-ICT Industries, Selected OECD
Countries, 1990 and 1999 (as % of GDP at current basic prices)
ICT-producing Industries  ICT-using Industries “Non-ICT” Sector
as % of Total Economy
1 as % of Total Economy
2 as % of Total Economy
1990 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999
Canada
3 4.2 4.8 20.3  20.9  75.5  74.3
Denmark 4.3  4.7  18.5  19.2 77.2  76.1
Finland 4.6  9.6  16.3  16.3  79.1  74.1
France
4 5.0 5.3 19.6  19.4  75.4  75.3
Germany
5 5.4 5.3 21.0  20.8  73.6  73.9
Italy 4.4  5.0  21.2  21.6  74.4  73.4
Japan
4 6.0 6.3 22.0  21.4  72.0  72.3
Netherlands 4.5  5.5  22.9  25.4  72.6  69.1
United 
Kingdom 5.7  7.0  21.6 22.4  72.7  70.6
United 
States 6.5  7.3  21.0  25.0  72.5  67.7
1 The ICT-producing sector consist of IT hardware, radio, television and communication equipment, medical
appliances and instruments and appliances for measurement (together the ICT industry) and telecommunication 
and computer services (together ICT services).
2 The distinction between intensive ICT-using industries and “non-ICT” industries is largely based on studies by
McGuckin and Stiroh (2001) and the National Science Foundation (2000) for the United States, making use of ICT
investment/output ratios and ICT capital stock shares by industry.
3 For Canada, value added at current prices for 1999 is derived by extrapolating 1996 current price estimate to 1999
with index in constant prices and using average deﬂators for 1990-1996.
4 For France and Japan for 1998.
5 For Germany for 1991 and 1998.
Source: Van Ark (2001b).
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the creation of intangible capital.
INTANGIBLE CAPITAL: THE
MISSING LINK?
The creation of a knowledge-based econ-
omy is now at the top of the economic policy
agenda in many industrialized nations. For exam-
ple, the Lisbon Declaration of the European
Union in spring 2000 identiﬁed the knowledge-
based economy as key to the creation of a com-
petitive economy.
17 Policy-oriented organizations
such as the OECD have made the investigation
of knowledge creation a priority on their research
agenda.
18 The academic literature has also given




Contribution by Sector to Labour-Productivity Growth, Selected OECD Countries, 1990-
1995 and 1995-1999 (in percentage points)
ICT-producing ICT-using Non-ICT Total
Sector Sector Sector Economy
Canada (1990-1995)  0.2  0.3  0.7  1.2
Canada (1995-1999) 0.3  0.4  0.3  1.0
Acceleration/deceleration 0.1  0.1  -0.4  -0.2
Denmark (1990-1995)  0.3  0.2  1.6  2.0
Denmark (1995-1999)  0.2  0.6 0.2  1.0
Acceleration/deceleration -0.1  0.4  -1.4  -1.0
Finland (1990-1995)  0.6  0.1  2.7  3.3
Finland (1995-1999)  1.4  0.6  0.7  2.7
Acceleration/deceleration 0.8  0.5  -2.0  -0.6
France (1990-1995)  0.2  0.2  0.8  1.1
France (1995-1998)  0.4  0.2  0.7  1.3
Acceleration/deceleration 0.2  0.0  -0.1 0.2
Germany (1991-1995)  0.1  0.5  1.5  2.1
Germany (1995-1998)  0.4  0.5  0.7  1.7
Acceleration/deceleration 0.3  0.0  -0.7  -0.4
Italy (1990-1995)  0.2  0.5  1.1  1.8
Italy (1995-1999)  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.6
Acceleration/deceleration 0.1  -0.3  -1.0  -1.2
Japan (1990-1995)  0.3  0.4  0.1  0.8
Japan (1995-1998)  0.4  0.3  0.1  0.8
Acceleration/deceleration 0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0
Netherlands (1990-1995)  0.1  0.3  0.9  1.3
Netherlands (1995-1999)  0.5  0.6  -0.2  0.9
Acceleration/deceleration 0.4  0.3  -1.1  -0.3
United Kingdom (1990-1995)  0.4  0.6  1.5  2.5
United Kingdom (1995-1999)  0.6  0.5  0.1  1.2
Acceleration/deceleration 0.2  -0.1  -1.4  -1.3
United States (1990-1995)  0.3  0.3  0.5  1.2
United States (1995-1999)  0.6  1.4  0.5  2.5
Acceleration/deceleration 0.3  1.1  0.0  1.3
Source: Van Ark (2001b) and McGuckin and van Ark (2001).
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not at all new.
19 The renewed urgency to deal
with the issue is partly related to the rise of ICT.
ICT is a typical general purpose technology,
characterized by its broad scope of applications
across the economy and its ability to generate a
continuous stream of cost-reducing innovations
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995). Its success-
ful diffusion is facilitated by investment in
human capital, knowledge capital and organiza-
tional capital, together labelled “investment in
intangible capital” (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000).
Despite its acknowledged importance, the
problems concerning the conceptualization of
intangible capital, and its measurement and
integration into a production function or growth
accounting framework, are still huge and large-
ly unresolved. Various deﬁnitions of intangible
capital are possible with different coverage, but
most are offsprings of Schumpeter’s (1934) clas-
siﬁcation, including the development of new
products and production processes, organiza-
tional change, management, marketing and
ﬁnance. A distinction can be made between nar-
row and broad concepts of intangible capital. The
narrow concept deals mainly with human capi-
tal and knowledge capital (see Figure 2). With
the rise of “new growth theory” in the 1980s and
1990s, these components are now well rooted in
mainstream neoclassical growth theory. New
growth models have improved the modelling of
increasing returns and interactions among input
variables that are typical of intangible assets. The
broad concept of intangible capital emphasizes
the facilitative role of intangible capital in the
search for new technologies. It assigns a clear role
to the attributes of the entrepreneur and his or
her ability to raise organizational capital.
20
From the growth accounting perspective
that is pursued in this paper, the narrower con-
cept of intangible capital is more attractive
because of its roots in the production function
and its focus on measurement of human capital
and knowledge capital at the macroeconomic or
industry level.
21 Howitt (1996) argues that
knowledge creation can be treated as capital for-
mation because it “can be produced, exchanged
and used in the production of other goods, or in
the production of itself. It can also be stored,
although subject to depreciation, as when people
forget or let their skills deteriorate, and subject
also to obsolescence, as when new knowledge
comes along to supersede it” (99-100). Diewert
(2001) clearly deﬁnes knowledge in the context
of production theory as “the set of input and
output combinations that a local establishment
could produce…[in a] given time period t” (93).
Hence, investment in knowledge capital refers
to an outward shift of the traditional production
function referred to above in the section on the
role of ICT capital.
For both Howitt (1996) and Diewert
(2001), the inherent measurement problems
of intangible capital go beyond those of tan-
gible capital, despite their similar character-
istics. Howitt classiﬁes these measurement
problems as follows:
The knowledge-input problem. This con-
cerns the measurement of the resources devot-
ed to the creation of knowledge, which often
cannot be distinguished unambiguously from
other inputs, such as labour and capital.
The knowledge-investment problem. This
refers to the output of the process of knowledge
creation, which typically is not measured at all
because knowledge does not for the most part
produce a commodity or service.
The quality-improvement problem. This relates
to the need to pick up on improvements in goods
and services that result from knowledge creation.
It is an inherent part of the criticism of official
statistical measures of prices and real output
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grams to improve their measurement methods.
22
The obsolescence problem. This refers to the
need, with any type of capital, to ﬁnd a meas-
ure of depreciation, which is very difficult for
intangible capital measures.
So far there has been little attempt to
measure intangible capital beyond human cap-
ital.
23 Measures of knowledge capital have not
gone much beyond the accumulation of R&D
expenditure combined with some rough
assumptions about its price and depreciation
pattern (Griliches and Cockburn 1988). To my
knowledge there are no available international
comparisons of organizational capital. Moreover,
it is difficult to distinguish investment from
operating expenses on intangibles. Finally,
measurement problems also arise because intan-
gible investments relate to services rather than
goods. In conclusion, then, the stock or ﬂow of
intangible assets is not easily measured. 
The latest international comparisons of
intangible expenditure — as opposed to invest-
ment or capital — were conducted under the aus-
pices of the OECD by Croes (2000) and Khan
(2001). But even Khan, whose work probably
represents the state of the art in this area, applies
a fairly narrow concept of intangible capital,
which includes measures of investment in higher
education (including private expenditure), R&D
(including the capital expenditure component)
and software.
24 Khan adjusted the estimates for
the overlap in some expenditure categories, such
as that between investment in higher education
and R&D, between higher education and soft-
ware, and between R&D and software.
One simple way to observe the extent
to which international differences in invest-
ment in intangible capital relate to diversity
in productivity performance is to compare
rankings of productivity estimates, the share
of ICT-producing and ICT-using industries
in GDP, and the share of knowledge invest-
ment shown in Table 7 of this paper. As dis-
cussed in an earlier section, minor differences
in relative levels should not be reﬂected as
different rankings. The rankings in Table 7
are therefore indifferent for between-country
differences in productivity of less than
2.0 percentage points, differences in the com-
bined ICT production and use share of less
than 1.0 percentage points, and differences
in the share of knowledge expenditure in
total GDP of less than 0.2 percentage points.
The United States ranks second in terms
of intangible-investment intensity and between
third and sixth in terms of productivity (i.e., its
productivity ranking cannot be distinguished




Classiﬁcation of Intangible Capital




b-1 Research and development
b-2 Patents
b-3 Licences, brands, copyrights
b-4 Other technological innovations, 







c-3 Construction and use of databases
c-4 Remuneration of innovative ideas
d) Marketing of new products
e) Social capital
Source: Based on Vosselman (1998) and Young (1998).
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its expenditure on higher education (1.9 percent,
against 1.2 percent for the OECD as a whole
and 0.7 percent for the European Union).
Moreover, the United States also stands out in
terms of its share (the largest) of ICT-producing
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TABLE 7
Rankings of Labour Productivity and Income levels, ICT Output Shares and
Knowledge Investment/Output Ratios, OECD Countries
Output Share 
Labour of ITC Producers  Investment in Knowledge




2 R&D software education total rank
3
Belgium 112.4  1  1.9 1.4 0.4 3.7  13-16
Norway 109.7  2  1.7 1.2 1.0 4.0  9-14
France  101.8  3-4  24.7  9  2.2 1.2 0.8 4.1  9-14
Netherlands  100.9  3-4  30.9  2  2.0 1.7 0.7 4.3  9-11
United 
States  100.0  3-6  32.3  1  2.6 1.5 1.9 6.0  2
Ireland  98.4  5-6  1.4 0.5 1.1 3.1  17-18
Austria  95.9  7  1.8 0.9 0.8 3.5  15-17
Denmark 93.5  8-9  23.9 10  1.9 1.5 1.1 4.6 6-8
Germany 92.5  8-9  26.1 6-8 2.3 1.2 0.7 4.2  9-12
Italy  88.0  10-11  27.1 4-5 1.0 0.5 0.6 2.1  20-21
Finland  86.3  10-12  25.9 6-8 2.9 1.2 1.1 5.2 3-4
Switzerland  85.8  11-12  2.8 1.5 0.5 4.8 5-8
Canada  82.6  13-15  25.7 6-8 1.6 1.6 1.5 4.7 6-8
Australia  82.0  13-15  1.5 1.2 1.2 3.9  11-15
Sweden  81.7  13-15  3.8 1.9 0.8 6.5  1
United 
Kingdom 79.5 16 29.4  3  1.8 1.3 0.8 3.9  11-15
Spain  75.6 17  0.9 0.5 0.8 2.2  20-21
Japan  72.1 18 27.7 4-5 3.0 1.1 0.6 4.7 6-8
New 
Zealand 60.8  19
Greece  58.5 20  0.6 0.2 0.9 1.7  22-23
Portugal  52.1 21  0.6 0.4 0.8 1.8 22-23
Hungary  47.2 22  0.7 1.0 0.8 2.6 19
Korea  41.1 23  2.6 0.4 2.2 5.2 3-4
Czech 
Republic  39.0 24  1.3 1.2 0.8 3.3  16-18
Mexico  32.8 25  0.4 0.4 0.7 1.5 24
Poland 32.2  26
Turkey 27.5  27
OECD  76.5  2.2 1.2 1.2 4.7
European 
Union
4 87.4  1.8 1.0 0.7 3.6
1 Countries within a 2%-point productivity range were ranked the same.
2 Countries within a 1%-point ICT-share range were ranked the same.
3 Countries within a 0.2%-point knowledge-intensity range were ranked the same.
4 European Union is weighted average for 14 EU member countries, excluding Luxembourg. 
Note: Knowledge investment includes R&D (including capital expenditure), higher education (including private
expenditure) and software, and is adjusted for overlap between investment in higher education and R&D, between
higher education and software, and between R&D and software.
Source: GGDC Total Economy Database, van Ark (2001b), Khan (2001), OECD Science, Technology and Industry
Scoreboard, 2001.
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GDP. But the relation between relative pro-
ductivity levels and intangible investment is far
from perfect. Indeed the country with the high-
est level of intangible capital, Sweden, ranks
between 13th and 15th in terms of productivi-
ty. Moreover, the two countries with produc-
tivity levels similar to Sweden’s (Canada and
Australia) rank much lower in knowledge inten-
sity. Sweden’s high R&D intensity is the main
reason for its high ranking, which can also be
said of Finland and Korea. Canada’s sixth to
eighth position on the ladder of intangible
expenditures is — as with the United States —
due to its high expenditure on higher education.
Table 8 looks at the dynamics of the rela-
tion among the acceleration in productivity
growth,  the combined contribution of ICT pro-
duction and ICT use to labour-productivity
growth, and the growth in knowledge expendi-
ture. At ﬁrst sight this picture looks somewhat
better than that for levels. Greece and Ireland,
which are among the countries with the greatest
accelerations in labour productivity during the
second half of the 1990s, also show the fastest
growth in intangibles. However, Greece and
Ireland are typical catching-up countries, so
their rapid growth on both indicators — start-
ing from relatively low levels — comes as no
surprise. The United States, which ranks
between ﬁfth and seventh in terms of produc-
tivity acceleration, ranks between ninth and
15th in terms of growth in knowledge expen-
diture. Sweden, Finland and Denmark score
high on growth in knowledge expenditure, all
ranking between third and eighth, but much
lower on acceleration of productivity growth
during the second half of the 1990s.
It can be concluded that the crude com-
parisons shown here do not suggest a clear-cut
story on the role of intangibles in explaining
the recent growth differentials among OECD
countries. However, it should be emphasized
that these measures relate only to those com-
ponents of intangible capital that are easy to
quantify (R&D, software, education). More
importantly, these measures are likely to be
most strongly related to tangible investment
in new high-tech equipment, such as IT and
communications equipment, which compli-
cates the explanatory growth story — an issue
brieﬂy touched upon earlier in this paper.
The measures for intangible expenditure
used so far do not include various other compo-
nents of the broad deﬁnition of intangible capi-
tal, especially organizational capital. Indeed
micro research suggests that the successful
implementation of ICT is greatly facilitated by
investment in organizational capital. For exam-
ple, a 1996 Danish study showed that the
growth in productivity brought about by ICT
is four or ﬁve times greater if it also involves
changes in work-ﬂoor methods. Norwegian
research has shown that the returns on physical
capital are 50 percent higher if the investment
in ICT is accompanied by a comprehensive ICT
strategy within the particular organization
(UNICE 2001). A recent study by Brynjolfsson
and Hitt (2000) of 800 US ﬁrms found that the
overall expenditure on non-material capital that
ﬁrms must make when introducing ICT is at
least 10 times greater than the expenditure on
ICT itself.
More recently, Yang and Brynjolfsson
(2001) argue that the omission from the growth
accounts of expenditures associated with the
creation of intangible assets is a main reason for
the productivity slowdown which began in
1973. If these expenditures relative to ICT
investment have remained constant, then the
recent productivity surge may have been under-
estimated. To make their case, Yang and
86
Bart van Ark
Bart van Ark text  11/27/02  2:17 PM  Page 86Brynjolfsson combine traditional growth
accounting with the q-theory of investment. In
this way the market valuation of the assets rep-
resents their tangible and intangible value. This
methodology has not yet been applied to inter-
national comparisons.
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TABLE 8
Rankings of Labour-Productivity Growth and Acceleration, Acceleration of ICT Contribution
to Productivity Growth and Growth in Knowledge Investment, OECD Countries
Contribution of ITC Producers
and Users to Acceleration
Change in Growth Rate  of Labour Productivity Growth in
of GDP Per Hour Worked (percentage points) Knowledge Investment 
1995-2001 %-share 1995-99
over 1990-95 rank
1 over 1990-95 rank
1 1991-98 rank
2
Mexico 3.1  1
Czech 
Republic 2.2  2
Greece 1.9  3  10.1 1-2
Ireland 1.5 4  10.2  1-2
United 
States 0.9 5-7  1.4 1-2 3.9  9-15
Austria 0.8 5-7  6.3 4-8
Switzerland 0.8  5-7  3.2  10-16
Turkey 0.0 8-14
Japan 0.0  8-14  0.0  7-10  2.6  14-17
Australia -0.1 8-14 4.0  9-14
Belgium -0.1  8-14
Netherlands  -0.2 8-17  0.7 3  3.8 9-15
Poland -0.2  8-17
Sweden -0.2 8-17  7.6  3-4
New 
Zealand -0.3  10-19
Finland -0.3  10-19 1.3  1-2  6.8 3-5
Canada -0.4 12-19  0.2  4-9  2.6 14-17
France  -0.5 12-19  0.2  4-9  3.0 11-17
Hungary -0.5 12-19  1.6 17-18
United 
Kingdom -0.8 20  0.1 4-9 3.6  9-15
Denmark -1.2  21-22  0.3  4-8  5.9  4-8
Korea -1.4  21-23
Portugal -1.6 22-25  5.4  5-8
Norway -1.7  23-25  5.6  5-8
Germany  -1.7 23-25  0.3  4-8  2.2 15-18
Spain -2.2 26-27  4.3  9-13




OECD 0.1  3.4
1 Countries within a 0.2%-point range of productivity acceleration were ranked the same.
2 Countries within a 0.2%-point knowledge-intensity growth range were ranked the same.
3 European Union is weighted average for 14 EU member countries, excluding Luxembourg.
Note: Knowledge investment includes R&D (including capital expenditure), higher education (including private expen-
diture) and software, and is adjusted for overlap between investment in higher education and R&D, between higher
education and software, and between R&D and software. See Khan (2001), Figure 6, for a breakdown by subcategory.
Source: GGDC Total Economy Database, van Ark (2001b) and Kahn (2001).
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We have reviewed some of the reasons for
differences in growth performance and changes
in the income and productivity gaps among
OECD countries. The United States has contin-
ued to enjoy the highest per capita income of all
OECD countries. Despite their faster GDP
growth, most countries have seen little or no nar-
rowing of the per capita income gap between
them and the United States over the past decade
(see Chart 1). Before the mid-1990s the reasons
for the failure to narrow this gap were related to
the underperformance of the labour market,
which offset the catch-up effects in terms of pro-
ductivity growth in the follower countries.
However, for the period 1995-2001 sluggish pro-
ductivity growth seems to one of the main caus-
es of slower growth in Europe, Japan and Canada.
Using a conceptual framework, which is
rooted in a traditional growth accounting frame-
work — but with several extensions — we
focused on two sources of growth differentials.
First we looked at the role of the “new econo-
my,” in the sense that ICT has been a source of
faster productivity growth in the United States.
Then we looked at the impact of the creation of
intangible capital, which has been identiﬁed as
a necessary condition for exploiting the produc-
tivity advantages of ICT investment.
The analysis suggests that differential
realization of the potential to generate produc-
tivity accelerations from ICT has contributed
to the differential economic growth perform-
ance among OECD countries. At the same
time, it is difficult to precisely measure the
contribution of the various factors at the
macroeconomic level. One may even argue that
the traditional methods for analysing and
measuring the relation between inputs and
output at the macroeconomic level are, increas-
ingly, failing to describe the processes that
drive changes and differences in growth per-
formance between ﬁrms. Nevertheless, the past
several years have seen signiﬁcant advances in
growth theory and improvements in measure-
ment methods, even though it is probably true
that formal theory is ahead of conceptual clar-
ity and reliable measurement (Howitt 1996).
This paper has identiﬁed some areas for further
research, such as the need to improve the meas-
urement of ICT capital as well as the analysis
of its contribution to growth, to extend meas-
ures of intangible capital to organizational cap-
ital, and to disaggregate input and output
measures to the level of industries.
Macroeconomic analysis and measure-
ment of sources of growth remain crucial to our
understanding of the relation among econom-
ic growth, improvement in living standards
and social progress. Per capita income is a rea-
sonable — though imperfect — proxy for liv-
ing standards, one that is fairly comparable
across countries. Many sources of economic
growth are themselves direct contributors to
improvements in living standards and social
progress. For example, the creation of human
capital and the creation of knowledge are
important determinants of social progress, and
income growth provides feedback on the
demand for such assets. Efficient allocation of
such scarce resources is essential for full
exploitation of this potential in order to raise
living standards and drive social progress.
NOTES
This paper was written while I was a Visiting Fellow at
the Economic Growth Center at Yale University. Parts
of the paper are based on earlier work, including van
Ark (2001a, 2001b), van Ark and McGuckin (1999),
and McGuckin and van Ark (2001, 2002). I am
grateful to Thomas Rymes, Andrew Sharpe and other
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Bart van Ark text  11/27/02  2:17 PM  Page 88participants at the IRPP-CSLS workshop “Productivity
and Social Progress in Canada: Perspectives and
Prospectives” for their helpful comments.
1 See, for example, various issues of the United
Nations Human Development Report. See also Banting,
Sharpe and St-Hilaire (2001).
2 See van Ark (2001a) for a more extensive discussion.
3 The 2001 numbers are preliminary ﬁgures based on
estimates of output and employment from OECD
Economic Outlook (December 2001).
4 It should be noted that the productivity growth rates
for Canada differ from other estimates, which show
that productivity growth rates in the Canadian
business sector have not decelerated since the mid-
1990s (see, e.g., Sharpe’s contribution in this volume).
The estimates in Table 1 and throughout the
remainder of this paper refer to the total economy.
5 For all underlying data and a complete description of
sources, see the GGDC Total Economy Database
(http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc/index-dseries.html). All
dollar-based estimates are expressed at 1996 price
levels. This price measure is preferable because all
national currency estimates are converted to US dollars
on the basis of purchasing power parities (PPP) for
1996 (OECD 1999). It should be emphasized that
exact rankings of these estimates are hazardous given
the margin of error involved. Countries within a range
of 1-2 percent in terms of productivity and per capita
income cannot really be distinguished. See also the
ﬁnal section and Tables 7 and 8. There can be slight
differences between the data used here and the data
from national statistical offices. Our measures are
largely derived from OECD sources (national accounts
and labour force statistics). These are most comparable
internationally but can differ from national sources
because the OECD numbers may be less current or
somewhat differently deﬁned. For example, in the case
of Canada, mainly because of a lower GDP growth
estimate for 2001, the productivity growth rates from
the GGDC database are lower than those from
Statistics Canada for the period 1995-2001, and
therefore show somewhat greater deceleration
compared to the early 1990s.
6 However, there are also those who argue that ICT
does not have the potential to increase growth by as
much as the great innovations of the early 20th
century, such as electricity and the combustion
engine (Gordon 2000). In addition, Gordon stresses
that part of the growth acceleration in the United
States is due to pro-cyclical productivity in the
upward phase of the business cycle during the second
half of the 1990s. Indeed, it is only after a complete
cycle has passed that one can fully evaluate the
growth impact of ICT.
7 There are as yet no studies available on ICT
investment and its contribution to growth for the
whole of the European Union. See Daveri (2001) for
a study of proxy estimates of ICT investment based
on expenditure information. See van Ark et al.
(2002) for provisional estimates of ICT investment in
12 out of 15 EU member states.
8 In principle, equation (3) can also be rearranged to
obtain the rate of change of labour productivity:  
Q - L = SKN(KN- L) +SKC (KC - L) + A. It should be
recognized that KC and KN represent the annual
services that ICT capital and other capital goods
deliver to output growth, which are weighted at the
user cost of individual assets. The latter consist of the
gross rate of return times the current price of the
given asset. Gross rates of return on ICT capital are
typically high to compensate for the rapid price
declines of ICT goods. Hence the rapid growth of
individual capital services from ICT and the rapidly
increasing weights at which these enter the overall
measure of capital services account for the increasing
contribution of ICT capital to growth (see Schreyer
2000; Colecchia and Schreyer 2001).
9 Finland is a special case, however, as the production
of communications equipment is a dominant feature
of its manufacturing sector.
10 See van Ark (2002) for a review. At the national level,
except for the United States, growth accounting
studies with ICT as a separate input, and based on
actual investment data instead of reworked
expenditure data, were carried out for Finland (Jalava
and Pohjola 2001), France (Cette, Mairesse and
Kocoglu 2001), the Netherlands (van der Wiel 2001)
and the United Kingdom (Oulton 2001). The overall
picture suggests that most countries show somewhat
lower contributions of ICT to economic growth than
the United States, the one exception being Finland.
11 As a result, if there are any supra-normal returns on ICT
capital, these end up in the TFP residual. See Schreyer
(2000) and Stiroh (2002) for a discussion of this issue.
12 Here, one speaks of an assumption of Harrod-neutral
technical change, keeping the capital-output ratio
rather than the capital-labour ratio constant. More
speciﬁcally, following the Harrod-Rymes concept of
technical change, the larger investment in ICT will
not reduce growth of total factor productivity, but
rather will raise it, as ICT improves the efficiency by
which the capital goods themselves are produced.
13 The distinction between intensive ICT-using industries
and non-ICT industries is largely based on studies by
McGuckin and Stiroh (2001) and the National Science
Foundation (2000) for the United States. See Table 4 in
van Ark (2001b) for the exact classiﬁcation used here.
Even though ICT-producing industries are also ICT-
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Bart van Ark text  11/27/02  2:17 PM  Page 89using industries (as the producers themselves also invest
heavily in ICT), ICT-producing industries are excluded
from the ICT-using sector in the analysis below. The
distinction between ICT-using industries and non-ICT
industries has two limitations. First, even though we
use one and the same classiﬁcation for all countries, ICT
investment-output ratios and ICT capital shares are not
necessarily distributed in the same way across countries.
For example, even though retailing is within the non-
ICT category in the classiﬁcation used here, it would in
fact fall within the ICT-using category in the United
States. Second, ICT investment intensity may not
always be the best criterion for determining the
potential impact of ICT on productivity. In some
industries even a small amount of ICT can generate
high returns because of its leverage on existing
activities. For example, in the oil-extraction industry a
small investment in ICT has fundamentally changed
the methods by which this industry explores new oil
reserves (see Olewiler’s contribution in this volume).
Obviously the classiﬁcation used here can be further
tested for its sensitivity for other distributions, which is
a topic for further research. See van Ark, Inklaar and
McGuckin (2002) for a more reﬁned classiﬁcation and
wider ranger of countries.
14 In fact seven sectors instead of three are
distinguished in the weighting scheme: ICT-
producing manufacturing, ICT-producing services,
ICT-using manufacturing, ICT-using services, other
manufacturing, other services, and remaining sectors
(such as agriculture, mining, construction and public
utilities). See van Ark (2001b).
15 For France, Germany and Japan the last period ended
in 1998; for Germany the ﬁrst period started in 1991.
16 In Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom the relative contribution of ICT
production and ICT use was higher than the two-
thirds contribution in the United States, but overall
labour-productivity growth in these countries was
much slower. The relatively rapid productivity




18 For example, the OECD Growth Project has targeted
knowledge creation as a pillar of sustainable growth.
See also the OECD’s Science, Technology and Industry
Scoreboard 2001 and STI Review #27 (2001).
19 See Ducharme (1998) for an overview of theory
related to intangible capital, which is rooted in
human capital theory, theory on technical
change, intellectual capital and new growth
theory. See Hill (1999) for classification issues.
Howitt (1996) and Diewert (2001) deal with the
conceptualization of knowledge capital in a
production function framework. Mortensen
(2000) also discusses the growth accounting work
related to intangible capital.
20 The latter is more ﬁrmly rooted in evolutionary theory
(see, e.g., Clement, Hammerer and Schwarz 1998).
Recently, the literature on the sources of growth has
moved a step further by looking at the creation of
organizational capital not only within the ﬁrm but also
within the society as a whole, so-called social capital
(see, e.g., Helliwell 2001; OECD 2001b). Here I
abstain from dealing with social capital as the problems
concerning its conceptualization and measurement go
beyond what can be achieved in the analytical
framework I am using. It should be noted, however,
that as far as OECD countries are concerned, the
empirical work has so far not shown large differences in
the effect of social capital on growth (Temple 1999).
21 See Mortensen (2000) for an overview of growth
accounting work including intangibles.
22 Much of the criticism of official accounts, particularly
price index measurement, stems from the work of
Griliches (1992, 1994) and the US Advisory Commission
to Study the Consumer Price Index in 1996. Recent
attempts by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the
Bureau of Economic Analysis in the United States,
supported by a range of studies at the Brookings
Institution, as well as new work by national statistical
office across the OECD and by Eurostat, have contributed
to many improvements in the measurement of prices and
real output to deal with quality issues, even though many
issues remain unresolved. See Dean and Harper (2001) for
a review of work in the United States. See van Ark (2002)
for references to other work, in particular in Europe.
23 See OECD (1998) for a review of international
comparisons of human capital. Kendrick (1976) is one
of the ﬁrst encompassing studies to measure intangible
capital beyond human capital; see also Kendrick (1994).
24 Croes (2000) uses a broader concept including
expenditure on private and secondary education and
marketing.
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